Taiwan is the world's largest regional market for semiconductor materials, and two assumptions about its supply chain are widespread enough to be worth testing. The first is that Taiwanese fabs buy their materials from Japan. The second is that Taiwan does not let Chinese industrial materials in. Taiwan's own customs records contradict the first line by line, and Taiwan's own import rules contradict the second: every raw-material line we checked is open to mainland China, while some finished ceramic and wafer lines are closed. For buyers and sellers the practical question is narrower: which tariff line a product falls under, because that decides whether a China-made item can be imported at all.
This article covers the chain's scale, who buys the materials (fabs, packaging houses, parts coaters), its 2024 customs record by origin, China's position after the 2025 controls, Taiwan's mainland-goods import regime, and what to settle before an order. It reflects public sources as of mid-October 2026. If you need only the action list, it is in the section "What a Taiwan-Based Buyer, or a Seller into Taiwan, Should Do".
Disclaimer: This article is general practical information, not legal, customs or trade-control advice. Our reading of Taiwan's import rules and trade statistics is analysis; rule codes and classification practice change, and specific transactions should be confirmed with a licensed customs broker and the competent Taiwanese authority.
The Buyer: Scale and Structure
SEMI puts Taiwan's 2025 semiconductor materials spending at US$21.7 billion, the largest of any region for the 16th consecutive year, against a global market of US$73.2 billion. These are spending figures; we do not convert them into tonnes.
The spending is concentrated. TSMC reported 2025 revenue of NT$3,809.05 billion, up 31.6%. Its annual report on Form 20-F lists one 6-inch, four 8-inch and six 12-inch fabs in Taiwan, with further fabs in Nanjing, Shanghai, Washington State, Arizona and Kumamoto, and annual capacity above 17 million 12-inch-equivalent wafers in 2025. Its 2026 capital expenditure guidance is US$52–56 billion. Press reports citing ITRI's industry-research unit put Taiwan's 2024 IC industry output at about NT$5.3 trillion; we could not locate ITRI's original release.
Who actually buys the materials is not always the fab. Chamber parts are cleaned, re-coated and refurbished through equipment makers' and specialists' operations in Taiwan. Lam Research has run a refurbishment centre in Taiwan through its Talus Manufacturing joint venture since 2016, according to Lam's 2016 announcement; UCT lists a Tainan subsidiary, Tainan Quantum Technologies, in its annual report filed in February 2026; press reports describe a NT$2 billion Tokyo Electron operations centre in Tainan, opened in December 2024, which the company said would shorten equipment repair times; and a Taiwanese listed company, 翔名 (TPEx 8091), is reported to manufacture and refurbish etch, implant and thin-film consumables using thermal spray, for customers including TSMC. We did not find who buys coating powders such as yttria for Taiwanese fabs, or in what share, and we do not estimate it.
Taiwan also makes some SiC, at small scale. Press reports describe Taisic producing N-type 8-inch and semi-insulating 4- to 8-inch substrates, and Episil with VIS targeting 8-inch SiC volume production in the second half of 2026. Neither is confirmed from a primary source. The economics of the 6-to-8-inch move are in our SiC wafer market analysis.
Where Taiwan's Materials Come From: The 2024 Customs Record
Taiwan's customs data by origin are available through UN Comtrade, where Taiwan reports as "Other Asia, nes". The latest full year there is 2024; Comtrade has no Taiwanese 2025 rows, and Taiwan's own country-by-product query portal was unreachable when we tried. The table is therefore Taiwan-reported 2024 data; the last column gives China's share by value and, where reported, by weight.
The pattern is consistent enough to state as a pattern, though not as a rule. China leads by weight in almost every line, and by value in the bulk inputs: SiC, hydrogen fluoride, alumina, n.e.c. ceramic articles. Japan and the US lead by value in the high-specification lines: doped wafers, technical ceramic wares, high-purity silicon and equipment parts. "Taiwan buys from Japan" is true of the expensive end and false of the bulk end. These statistics count every importer in Taiwan, not only fabs.
2846.90 is two different products under one heading. In 2024 the US shipped about 2.3 tonnes worth US$9.4 million (roughly US$4,082 per kilogram), while China shipped about 2,403 tonnes worth US$9.3 million (roughly US$3.87 per kilogram). Taiwan's tariff has a single 11-digit line for all non-cerium rare-earth compounds, so its statistics cannot isolate yttria, and nothing in this article reads 2846.90 as yttria.
What we can say about 2025 and 2026 is value only. Taiwan's Ministry of Finance publishes totals without origin. On that basis, 2846.90 imports fell 7.3% in 2025 to US$21.6 million, then reached US$35.5 million in January–September 2026, already 1.65 times the 2025 full year. Without tonnage we cannot split price from volume. For 2025 origin we have only mirror data, what other countries report exporting to Taiwan, on a different basis; in some lines it adds up to more than Taiwan's own total, so we read it as direction only. By mirror, Japan was the largest 2025 source of 2846.90 by value, ahead of the US and China.
Where China Sits After the 2025 Controls
China's April 2025 dual-use licensing of seven rare earths, including yttrium, shows in the mirror data for Taiwan. China reported exporting 2,446 tonnes of 2846.90 to Taiwan in 2024 and 382 tonnes in 2025: down 84% by weight, and 36% by value, with the unit value rising from about US$2.68 to US$10.98 per kilogram. For this line the mirror is credible: China's 2024 figure matches Taiwan's own record of China-origin 2846.90 within 2%.
What it does not show is a yttria figure. 2846.90 also holds lanthanum, neodymium, praseodymium and other compounds outside the April controls, so the fall cannot be attributed to yttria, and we could not find China's yttrium exports to Taiwan specifically for 2025 or 2026. For comparison, the economic division of Taiwan's representative office in Japan, in a report carried on the ITA's site in August 2026 and relaying Nikkei, reported Japan's first-half 2026 yttrium oxide imports at 204 tonnes, down 74% from the first half of 2024, describing yttrium as a coating input for semiconductor equipment parts.
The official Taiwanese reading. On October 12, 2025, Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) said that rare-earth-containing products and derivatives needed by Taiwan's semiconductor industry are supplied mainly from Europe, the US and Japan, so the direct impact is low. Two qualifications apply. First, by value that is consistent with Taiwan's 2024 record for 2846.90, where the US narrowly led China; by weight it is not, since China supplied 98.8% of the tonnage. Second, the statement addressed the elements China added in October 2025 and said those differ from the rare earths Taiwan's processes need. Yttrium was in the April list, not the October one, so the statement should not be read as saying yttrium has no fab impact. It gave no stockpile figure.
The April 2025 controls remain in force; the status of the suspended October 2025 measures, and the dates that now govern them, are set out in our rare-earth compounds import guide, with the yttrium mechanics in our yttrium export-control analysis. Other controlled inputs have their own posts: gallium and germanium, graphite, tungsten. One measure aimed directly at Taiwan is worth noting for what it did not include: MOFCOM's Announcement No. 35 of July 2025 listed eight Taiwanese defence, aerospace and shipbuilding entities, and no semiconductor or materials company.
Taiwan's Own Gate: The Mainland-Goods Import Regime
Taiwan's controls on goods from mainland China are commonly called a negative list (負面表列). In law they are the opposite. Article 7 of the Regulations Governing Trade between the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (臺灣地區與大陸地區貿易許可辦法, last amended February 2024) says that mainland goods may not be imported except under listed categories, the main one being goods the authority announces as permitted. The operational result reads like a negative list, because the Ministry of Economic Affairs' International Trade Administration (ITA) codes each tariff line:
- MW0: mainland goods not permitted;
- MP1: conditionally permitted, usually only the specific goods named under a line marked "EX";
- no code: permitted.
By the ITA's own count, of 12,611 tariff lines, 9,728 are permitted, 370 conditional and 2,513 prohibited. Chapter 28, inorganic chemicals, is entirely open: all 353 lines permitted. Chapter 69, ceramics, is mostly closed: 62 prohibited, 11 conditional, 37 permitted. 'Permitted' here means the line is open to mainland-origin goods; we did not confirm whether a permitted line still goes through an ITA import permit in practice, or what other agencies require for a given chemical. Ask your customs broker for the permit status of the exact 11-digit line before ordering. Article 11 requires import documents to state 「中國大陸產製」 (made in mainland China).
The lines a materials buyer is most likely to meet, as coded in the ITA and customs files we downloaded in October 2026:
Two things follow from the table.
The raw materials are open; the barriers sit at the article level. China-origin yttria, zirconia, SiC powder, alumina and hydrogen fluoride are all permitted under Taiwan's own codes. The bans fall on specific finished goods.
Classification decides whether a China-made part can enter. An alumina, zirconia or SiC chamber component could be argued as a part of semiconductor equipment (8486.90, permitted, 0% MFN duty), a technical ceramic ware (6909, permitted) or a fine ceramic (6914.90.90.10, prohibited, 10% MFN duty). We found no Taiwanese customs ruling that settles which applies to such parts, so this is a classification risk, not an outcome we can report. SiC wafers are the same kind of open question: if Taiwanese customs places them in 3818.00.10.90, China-origin SiC wafers would be prohibited, but we found no ruling confirming where they fall, and we do not say they are banned.
Science parks have an exception. Article 7 also lets bonded factories and companies in technology industrial parks and science parks import otherwise non-permitted mainland raw materials and components, for processing for export, under conditions announced by the ITA for bonded factories and by the park authorities (the Industrial Park Bureau or the National Science and Technology Council) for park companies. We could not retrieve the conditions.
What a Taiwan-Based Buyer, or a Seller into Taiwan, Should Do
Classify first, at 11 digits. Before sourcing a China-made ceramic part, wafer or device, determine its Taiwanese 11-digit line and read the import-rule code against it in the ITA and customs files. For anything that could sit on the 8486.90 / 6909 / 6914.90.90.10 boundary, or a SiC wafer that could sit in 3818.00.10.90, ask customs for an advance classification ruling before the first order. Have it before the goods reach the border. If you are the seller, give the buyer's broker the exact product description, the country of origin you will declare, and the 11-digit line you believe applies, so the ruling request and the 「中國大陸產製」 statement describe the same goods.
Check the conditions, not only the code. An MP1 line admits only the goods named under it, and the paperwork must state 「中國大陸產製」.
If you are in a science park, ask the park bureau. The Article 7 exception for processing-for-export may cover a mainland component that is otherwise prohibited, but its conditions are set by the park authority and we could not read them. Get the answer in writing from the bureau.
Write the specification in measured properties. A brand grade does not let a second source be qualified against it; composition with its basis, particle size with its method, surface area and impurity limits element by element do, as set out in our Japanese materials landscape. For a coating powder, particle size and morphology come before purity; our yttrium oxide page separates plasma-spray granules from sintering powder for that reason, and our CVD-SiC parts page fixes inspection items and their measurement conditions in writing before an order.
Map the China exposure under a non-Chinese purchase. Taiwan's 2846.90 tonnage came overwhelmingly from China in 2024 even when the value did not; ask a Japanese or US supplier where its oxide comes from. Test equivalence on your own process with a lot plan such as our sample-evaluation protocol. Check what a supplier's documents prove with our vendor audit checklist, and build the licence risk into the contract as in our procurement strategy guide.
Taiwan's Own Export Controls, and the US Measures Around Them
Taiwan controls exports of strategic high-tech commodities (SHTC) under regulations last amended in October 2023: listed items need an export permit from the ITA, valid for six months (two years for some destinations) and usable across several shipments, and re-export of imported SHTC can need the original country's consent. In June 2025 the ITA updated its SHTC export entity list, adding 601 entities across Russia, Pakistan, Iran, Myanmar and mainland China, including, it said, Chinese-funded technology firms. Exports of SHTC items to listed entities now need an ITA permit, and customs will stop shipments without one.
For the record, the US measures that touch Taiwan's chip trade as of mid-October 2026 are these. Proclamation 11002 under Section 232, effective January 15, 2026, imposed a 25% tariff on what it calls "a very narrow category of semiconductors", leaving most chips and equipment untouched. A Section 301 action effective July 24, 2026 applies a 10% tariff net of MFN to products of Taiwan, excluding articles already under Section 232. We found no source on how any of this has changed Taiwan's materials sourcing, and we make no claim about it.
What we did not find matters as much. We found no semiconductor materials or rare earths added to Taiwan's SHTC list, so there is no basis for saying the entity list restricts re-export of plain oxides or powders; it restricts SHTC items to listed end users.
For Korean Readers: Taiwan as a Market
Korea Customs Service data show Korea's exports to Taiwan rising from US$33.97 billion in 2024 to US$49.07 billion in 2025, mostly ICs (US$34.77 billion in 2025, largely memory). Taiwan is also a real market for Korean equipment parts: US$736.1 million of 8486.90 in 2025, 17.8% of Korea's exports of that line.
Raw-material flows are small, under US$2 million per line for SiC, zirconia, alumina and rare-earth compounds. Korean yttria (HSK 2846.90-1000) to Taiwan rose from 1,841 kilograms in 2025 to 12,131 kilograms in January–September 2026: a signal, not a volume.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does Taiwan's semiconductor industry buy its materials mainly from Japan?
By value, Japan leads in high-specification lines: in Taiwan's 2024 customs data it supplied 56.6% of doped wafers and 44.6% of other technical ceramic wares. China led by value in silicon carbide (79.1%), hydrogen fluoride (76.0%) and alumina (38.7%), and supplied 98.8% of rare-earth compounds by weight.
Can Taiwan import yttrium oxide, zirconia or silicon carbide from mainland China?
Under the mainland-goods rule codes, yes: the rare-earth compound line (including yttria), zirconium dioxide, silicon carbide and alumina are coded permitted, and all of Chapter 28 is open. That does not mean no permit or other agency rule applies. China's own export licensing for yttrium is a separate matter on the exporter's side.
Are China-made ceramic chamber parts banned in Taiwan?
It depends on classification, which we could not confirm: fine ceramics (6914.90.90.10) are prohibited from the mainland, technical ceramic wares (6909) and equipment parts (8486.90) permitted. An advance ruling settles it for a given part.
Is Taiwan's mainland-goods regime a negative list?
In law it is a permitted list: Article 7 bars mainland goods except those announced as permitted. The ITA codes each line prohibited (MW0), conditional (MP1) or permitted, so it works like a negative list; about 77% of lines are permitted.
Did China's 2025 rare-earth controls reduce supply to Taiwan?
China's reported exports of 2846.90 to Taiwan fell 84% by weight from 2024 to 2025. The line covers all non-cerium rare-earth compounds, so the fall cannot be attributed to yttrium; we found no yttrium-specific figure.
References (Public Sources)
- Taiwan Ministry of Justice law database: Regulations Governing Trade between the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (amended February 19, 2024), Articles 3, 7, 8, 9 and 11; Regulations Governing Export and Import of Strategic High-Tech Commodities (amended October 31, 2023).
- Ministry of Economic Affairs, International Trade Administration open data: import and export rules by tariff line; lists of prohibited, conditionally permitted and permitted mainland goods; statistics of open and closed lines by chapter (all downloaded October 15, 2026).
- Ministry of Finance: customs import tariff file with import rules; HS 6-digit import totals, 2024 to September 2026.
- UN Comtrade: Taiwan-reported 2024 imports by origin, and partner-reported 2024–2025 exports to Taiwan, queried October 15, 2026.
- Korea Customs Service import and export statistics by item and country, queried October 15, 2026.
- ITA press release of June 15, 2025 on the SHTC export entity list update; ITA explainer on strategic high-tech commodities.
- Ministry of Economic Affairs press release of October 12, 2025 on China's rare-earth export controls.
- Economic Division, Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Japan (carried on the ITA site), report of August 21, 2026, relaying Nikkei and Japanese customs data on yttrium oxide imports.
- MOFCOM Announcement No. 35 of 2025 (July 9, 2025).
- SEMI releases on 2025 materials (May 12, 2026) and 2025 equipment billings (April 7, 2026).
- TSMC: December 2025 revenue report, fourth-quarter 2025 earnings release and annual report on Form 20-F (filed April 2026). UMC fourth-quarter 2025 results. ASE 2025 unaudited results.
- UCT annual report on Form 10-K filed February 23, 2026; Lam Research release of September 6, 2016 on Talus Manufacturing.
- Press reports: TechNews (September 2024, February 2025, October 2025), Liberty Times (October 2026), MoneyWeekly (April 2026), Taipei Times (December 2024).
What we could not confirm: Taiwan-reported 2025–26 imports by origin, and tonnage; any yttria-specific Taiwanese import figure, or China's yttrium exports to Taiwan; Taiwanese customs classification of SiC wafers, YSZ powder, CVD-SiC or sintered SiC focus rings, alumina or zirconia chamber parts, SiC power modules and triflic acid; the meaning of several import codes, including 553; whether permitted lines require an ITA import permit in practice; the conditions for science-park and bonded-factory imports under Article 7; why the ITA's count of prohibited lines (2,513) differs from the customs tariff file (2,604); who buys coating powders for Taiwanese fabs; the status of Taiwanese SiC substrate projects beyond press reports; any Taiwanese government statement on rare-earth stockpiles or yttrium-specific fab impact; any budgeted Taiwanese programme for localizing semiconductor materials, as distinct from chips or equipment; any addition of materials to Taiwan's SHTC list; and any effect of US tariffs on Taiwan's materials sourcing. Where these arise above, we have said so rather than fill the gap.
Nami Tech Solutions (NTS) supplies, through China sourcing, several of the materials covered here, including yttrium oxide, SiC powder, CVD-SiC and alumina. For a Taiwan-based buyer we identify the likely tariff line and its mainland-goods code before quoting, say where a ruling is needed, and write the reference grade as measured properties.
